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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
L Y R A D McCONKIE and \ 
I L E N E McCONKIE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I 
I Case No. 
VS
' f 13614 
F L O I D C. H A R T M A N and I 
R U T H A. H A R T M A N , his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents, j 
Brief of Defendants-Respondents 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
Plaintiffs complained on November 30, 1972, (R-
1) that a deed which defendants delivered and which 
plaintiffs caused to be recorded on February 26, 1964, 
(R. 8) contained a reservation of mineral interests which 
was not within a uniform real estate contract dated No-
vember 1,1960. Plaintiffs prayed for reformation of the 
deed, decree of quiet title and specific performance of 
the contract based upon fraud. 
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Defendants alleged latches and the applicable stat-
utes of limitations for actions upon oral and written 
contracts and for actions based upon fraud. They con-
tended that the agreements prior to the conveyance 
merged into the deed and that the deed with the reserv-
ation was according to the contemplated agreement be-
tween the parties. (R. 38-52) 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The District Court for Duchesne County with the 
Honorable J . Robert Bullock presiding heard the evi-
dence and arguments of counsel at trial of this matter 
and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
upon which judgment for defendants was entered. (R. 
79-87) 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendants seek affirmation of the judgment of 
the District Court based upon its findings or based upon 
the contentions urged by defendants to the trial court 
that all prior agreements of the parties merged into the 
deeds delivered to plaintiffs or the deeds expressed the 
contemplated agreement between the parties. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The plaintiffs' brief contains inaccurate statements 
of fact. They are contrary to the record and contrary to 
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the trial court's findings of fact (R. 79-87) which are 
presumed correct. 
Preliminarily, the subject matter of this suit is not 
the real property described in Exhibits 2 and 3. I t is 
only that real property described in Exhibit 2. The only 
warranty deed the plaintiffs sought to reform by their 
complaint (R. 1-8) and amended complaint (R. 15-18) 
was plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 (R. 8, 448-450). Plaintiffs had 
no interest in the real property described in Exhibit 3. 
Plaintiffs conveyed the real property they had received 
by Exhibit 3 from defendants to a Mr. Roy Warren on 
February 13, 1967. Plaintiffs conveyed that property to 
Warren by defendants' Exhibit 12 (R. 52-55, 84). In-
terestingly, Mr. McConkie claimed he intended a reser-
vation of the mineral interests in that real property 
when he conveyed to Mr. Warren but failed to write a 
reservation in the deed which is Exhibit 12 (R. 357-
359). In other words, throughout this action the plain-
tiffs claim a reservation of mineral interests unto them-
selves when there was no written reservation and denied 
the validity of the written reservations in the deeds the 
defendants delivered to them, Exhibits 2 and 3. (R. 
357-359) 
The defendants additionally correct and expand 
upon plaintiffs' statement of facts in further support of 
the trial court's findings of fact and in support of the 
trial court's ruling in denying defendants' motion to dis-
miss "pro forma" and ordering that defendants did not 
waive any rights if defendants proceeded to produce 
3 
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evidence (R. 400). In connection with that ruling the 
trial court said: 
" I don't think you've shown any fraud." 
. . . I don't think there would be any factual basis 
that the court could find any fraud upon the part 
of any party to this action. (R. 396)." 
On March 19, 1959, the defendants as sellers and 
Arthello Clark and his wife and Richard Titensor and 
his wife as purchasers entered into a uniform real estate 
contract which is Defendants' Exhibit No. 6. The Clarks 
and Titensors took possession of 292 acres of real prop-
erty near Altamont, Duchesne County, Utah under that 
contract which was defendants' farm. Although 80 acres 
of defendants' farm was omitted from the legal descrip-
tion in the contract, the plaintiffs believed the 80 acres 
was included (R. 364-365, 378-380). Mr. McConkie had 
known the defendants for approximately 35 years (R. 
314-315). H e was familiar with defendants' farm and 
knew the Clarks and Titensors had possession of all 292 
acres of defendants' farm under the contract of sale (R. 
321-328). Defendants admitted the 80 acres had been 
omitted from the legal description by inadvertence (R. 
410). There was no reservation of mineral interests in 
the March 19, 1959, contract (Ex. D-6). 
Ten days later on March 29, 1959, the defendants 
and the Clarks and Titensors entered into an escrow 
agreement with First Security Bank of Utah as escrow 
(R. 410). The March 19, 1959 contract, the March 29, 
1959, escrow agreement and two warranty deeds dated 
March 29, 1959, were deposited with the bank as escrow 
4 
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(Ex. D-7). The contract, escrow agreement and two 
warranty deeds did not contain a legal description of the 
80 acres. Apparently, the omission in the original con-
tract of March 19, 1959, caused the omissions of the 80 
acres in the subsequent documents of escrow and con-
veyance. However, the two warranty deeds with the de-
fendants as grantors and the Clarks and Titensors as 
grantees that were placed in the escrow file on March 
29, 1959, contained reservations of mineral interests. 
(Ex. D-7) The warranty deed for the real property in 
Section 1 reserved unto the defendants three-fourths of 
all the oil, gas and mineral rights. The deed for the real 
property in Section 32 contained a reservation unto the 
defendants of one-fourth of all the oil, gas and mineral 
rights. (Ex. D-7) Curiously, a line had been drawn 
through those deeds in the escrow's file, (Ex. D-7). 
Sometime in September, 1960, the plaintiffs be-
came interested in taking an assignment of the Clarks' 
and Titensors' purchasers' interest in the March 19, 
1959, contract, (Ex. D-6). Plaintiffs negotiated with 
the Clarks and conferred with the escrow, First Secur-
ity Bank (R. 323-325, 364-366). The defendant, Mr. 
McConkie, had previous experience in purchasing real 
estate with First Security Bank as escrow of real estate 
contracts (R. 332-334). H e knew deeds held in escrow 
would be delivered by the escrow to him or to the Coun-
ty Recorder who would mail the deeds to him (R. 333-
334). 
On October 31, 1960, the Clarks and Titensors as-
signed their interest in the March 19, 1959, contract to 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the plaintiffs (R. 328-332, 336, 364-366). That written 
assignment is defendants' Exhibit D-5. I t was deposited 
with the escrow and filed in Exhibit 7. 
On November 1, 1970, there was a meeting at the 
bank's or escrow's offices (R. 332). The March 19, 
1959, contract had to be amended to reflect the settle-
ment of a lawsuit between the parties to that contract 
(R. 437). As a result of their settlement of claims and 
counterclaims the provisions for personal property, for 
real property defendants had received from the Clarks 
and Titensors as part of the purchase price, for the bal-
ance owing on the contract, for the terms of payment 
and for the interest on mortgages of the sellers' interest 
had to be amended (R. 410-414, 420-423, 429-432, 437). 
Furthermore, the defendants wanted to correct the 
omission of the 80 acres from the description and they 
wanted a statement of their mortgage to Equitable Life 
included (R. 377-380). Naturally, the asignee of the 
March 19, 1959, contract had to approve the amend-
ments which they did and plaintiffs and defendants 
signed a uniform real estate contract form prepared by 
one of the officers of First Security Bank of Utah to 
reflect the amendments. That document is Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 1 which is dated November 1, 1960, (R. 378-
380, 408-414, 420-423, 429-432, 437). 
After plaintiffs became assignees of the Clarks' and 
Titensors' interest in the property they made payments 
to the escrow, First Security Bank, as assignees and ac-
cording to the amended contract for three years (R. 
338). The escrow's file contained the March 19, 1959, 
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contract, the two warranty deeds to the Clarks and 
Titensors with reservations of Mineral interests, the as-
signment dated October 31, I960, and the November 1, 
1960, amendment to the March 19, 1959, contract (Ex. 
P . 7). There was not another escrow agreement exe-
cuted when plaintiffs and defendants deposited the No-
vember 1, 1960, amendment (Ex. P- l ) with First Se-
curity Bank as escrow but subsequently the plaintiff, 
Mr. McConkie, signed a release of escrow on February 
26,1964, (Ex. D-14) as assignee of the March 19, 1959, 
contract between defendants and the Clarks and Titen-
sors (R. 381, 336-338). That release of escrow (Ex. 
D-14) signed by Mr. McConkie was deposited in the 
escrow file (Ex. D-7; R. 402-403). 
On or about December 8, 1960, the defendants 
realized they had not deposited warranty deeds with the 
escrow to replace the deeds with the Clarks and Titen-
sors as grantees which contained reservations of mineral 
interests. They contemplated that the plaintiffs stood in 
the shoes of the Clarks and Titensors as their assignees. 
A reservation of mineral interests was always contem-
plated between the defendants and the Clarks and 
Titensors. Defendants thought that a reservation in the 
deeds on deposit with the escrow expressed that con-
templation and that it was unnecessary to express it 
otherwise. Therefore, they instructed their attorney, 
Mr. George Stewart, to draft two warranty deeds to 
replace the warranty deeds on deposit. The only changes 
they requested in the warranty deeds were a change of 
the grantees from the Clarks and Titensors to the plain-
7 
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tiffs and a change of one legal description to include the 
80 acres which had been inadvertently omitted. The 
deeds were drafted, executed and deposited with the 
escrow on or about December 8, 1960 (R. 422-442). 
On or about November 20, 1963, the plaintiffs 
wanted to borrow $75,000.00 from Travelers Insurance 
Company. They proposed to secure the loan with a 
mortgage on the real property they were purchasing 
from defendants (Ex. D-8; R. 339). The Travelers 
committed itself to loan $75,000.00 to plaintiffs on cer-
tain conditions which included that plaintiffs had good 
record title to the real property, that plaintiffs procure 
title insurance and that plaintiffs furnish an opinion 
setting forth the mineral interests in the real property 
(Ex. D-8; R. 339). 
The plaintiffs negotiated with defendants for a 
discounted payoff of the balance owing defendants (R. 
344-345). The plaintiffs also retained Security Title 
Company to cause record title in plaintiffs' names, to 
issue title insurance and to give an opinion setting forth 
the mineral interests in the real property according to 
the conditions in Traveler's letter of committment to 
loan which is Ex. D-8 (R. 343-344, 352-353, 360-363, 
368, 390). 
The defendants had instructed the escrow concern-
ing the orally agreed discounted payoff and signed and 
delivered the release of escrow (Ex. D-14) to the bank 
which filed the correspondence and release in Exhibit 
D-7 (R. 344-345). 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Sometime before and on or about February 26, 
1964, plaintiffs were contacted by a representative of 
Security Title Company for the purpose of causing 
record title in their names and complying with the con-
ditions for the $75,000.00 loan from Travelers (R. 353, 
360-363). The title company's representative, Mr. An-
derson, visited plaintiffs at their home and plaintiffs 
signed the mortgage (Ex. D-10) which included an as-
signment of all rents and royalties from mineral inter-
ests (R. 350-351). Plaintiffs knew from past experi-
ence that mineral interests were involved and plaintiffs 
knew that Mr. Anderson was going to perfect record 
title in their name and obtain deeds to the defendants' 
property and record them (R. 352-353, 356, 360-363). 
Mr. McConkie who knew about the escrow file at First 
Security Bank signed the release of escrow (Ex. D-14) 
on February 26, 1964, in order that there would be de-
livery of the warranty deeds in escrow and in order that 
they would be recorded in the County Recorder's office 
(R. 381). 
After plaintiffs were visited by Mr. Anderson at 
their home, he called from the offices of the escrow, 
First Security Bank. H e advised plaintiffs that there 
was a problem with the title. Mr. McConkie went to the 
bank and may have signed the release of escrow releas-
ing the deeds in its offices (R. 381). While he was at 
the offices of the escrow he additionally had conferences 
with officers of the bank and Mr. Anderson concerning 
the title. A major problem at that time was a stray deed. 
Mr. Anderson and Mr. McConkie went to Mr. Earl 
9 
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Dillman's office for the purpose of correcting the title 
problem to the satisfaction of Security Title. Mr. Dill-
man, Mr. McConkie and Mr. Anderson had a discussion 
concerning the title and Mr. Dillman caused a correc-
tion of the stray deed. On that same day, the warranty 
deeds containing the reservation of mineral interests 
(Ex. P-2 and 3) were delivered and they, along with 
the mortgage to Travelers, were recorded at the County 
Recorder's office at the request of Security Title Com-
pany. Mr. McConkie did not remember seeing the war-
ranty deeds with a reservation of mineral interests 
which he caused Security Title to record. At that time 
Mr. McConkie was not concerned about mineral inter-
ests. His one concern was acquiring title in the defend-
ants' farm and obtaining $75,000.00 from Travelers (R. 
367-368). 
Mr. McConkie paid Security Title for the title in-
surance, title opinion and other services that it rend-
ered along with the recording fees it advanced (Ex. 
D-11;R. 355-356). 
After plaintiffs became vested with title to the de-
fendants' farm on February 24, 1964, they gave a sec-
ond mortgage to First Security Bank in January, 1966 
(R. 357) and they conveyed the property in Section 32 
to Mr. Roy Warren in 1967 (R. 357-359). 
In connection with the conveyance to Mr. Warren 
in 1967 the defendants had to obtain a partial release 
of mortgage from Travelers and plaintiffs had some 
difficulty in negotiating it (R. 358-359). After convey-
10 
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ing to Warren, plaintiffs continued to cause consider-
able activity concerning the record title to the real pro-
perty in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 which was attached 
to their complaint (R. 320, 351). 
After all of the title work and conveyancing of the 
property in question by the plaintiffs during February, 
1964, and after they exercised dominion over the pro-
perty for approximately nine years under the recorded 
deeds with reservations of mineral interests, plaintiffs 
filed their complaint on November 30, 1972. (R. 1) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO FRAUD APPEARS IN THE RECORD 
AND NONE WAS FOUND. 
A review of the plaintiffs' statement of facts, de-
fendants' statement of facts and the record clearly re-
veals that the trial court was crorect when it inormed 
plaintiffs' counsel as follows: 
" I don't think you've shown any fraud. 
# # * 
I don't think there would be any factual basis 
that the court could find any fraud on the part of 
any party to this action. (R. 396)" 
The trial judge's observations were correct in view 
of the decision by this court in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 
11 
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141,247 P.2d 273 (1952). Defendants motion to dismiss 
should have been granted. 
POINT I I 
T H E FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST-
ING AT OR ABOUT T H E TIME T H E DEEDS 
W E R E RECORDED ON FEBRUARY 26, 1964, 
INCLUDING T H E RECORDING W E R E 
SUCH AS TO FURNISH F U L L OPPORTUNI-
TY TO T H E PLAINTIFFS FOR T H E DIS-
COVERY OF T H E MISTAKE, OR FRAUD, I F 
ANY EXISTED AND T H E STATUTES OF 
LIMITATION COMMENCED TO RUN AT 
THAT TIME BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS KNEW 
OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF T H E RE-
SERVATIONS. MORE THAN E I G H T YEARS 
HAVING ELAPSED SINCE T H E STATUTES 
COMMENCED RUNNING, PLAINTIFFS ' 
ACTION IS NOW BARRED. 
The statutes of limitation for a cause of action 
based of an instrument in writing is six years, § 78-12-23, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. The statute 
of limitation upon a contract or obligation not founded 
upon an instrument in writing is four years, § 78-12-25, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The statute 
of limitation for injury to real property or for an action 
for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake is three 
years, § 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
12 
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If a written contract in the case at bar was 
breached it was breached on the date the deeds were 
delivered and recorded on February 26, 1964, at 11:12 
a.m. If the contract were a written or oral contract the 
breach occurred at the same time. If any fraud occurred 
it occurred at the same time. 
Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until eight 
years and nine months after the breach of contract or 
fraud occurred. The only statute of limitation which 
did not unequivocally run is the limitation concerning 
actions based on mistake or fraud. That statute of lim-
itation of three years commenced to run when the fraud 
or mistake was discovered or should have been dis-
covered. 
Prior to plaintiffs becoming the assignee of the 
Clarks and Titensors they were familiar with the use 
of First Security Bank as an escrow in real estate trans-
actions. Mr. McConkie discussed the escrow with Mr. 
Clark and with the officers of First Security Bank, the 
escrow. He knew the escrow file was at the bank. H e 
knew the escrow would deliver the deeds upon payment 
of the balance owing on the contract and he knew the 
deeds were probably within the escrow's file. He ex-
ecuted a written assignment as assignee of the Clarks' 
and Titensors' interest. As assignee of their interest 
he and the defendants continued with the same escrow. 
When he negotiated a discounted payoff of the balance 
owing on the contract he retained Security Title to issue 
insurance, to give a separate opinion concerning min-
eral interests, and to cause title of record in his name. 
H e had the documents concerning the title exposed to 
13 
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him at his home when Mr. Anderson of Security Title 
visited him. H e went to the bank and signed a release 
of escrow on February 26, 1964, as assignee of the 
March 19, 1959, contract. H e discussed the title with 
the officers of the bank and Mr. Anderson. He then 
discussed the title with Mr. Ear l Dillman, an attorney 
at Roosevelt, Utah. H e wanted the title to be cleared 
in order that he could deliver a mortgage satisfactory 
to Travelers and obtain $75,000.00. Further, the plain-
tiffs knew that Security Title would record the deeds 
and that they would probably be mailed to him. On 
February 26, 1964, the deeds (Ex. P-2 and 3) were 
recorded at the request of Security Title along with 
the plaintiffs' mortgage to Travelers Insurance Com-
pany. The plaintiffs received $75,000.00 from Travel-
ers Insurance Company and they paid Security Title 
Company for their services, title insurance and opinion, 
and for the recording fees Security Title had paid. No 
one prevented the plaintiffs from reading the deeds 
which were probably present and exposed to them dur-
ing all of the activity concerning the title to the prop-
erty prior to the recording of the deeds. Certainly, the 
plaintiffs had every opportunity to examine the deeds 
prior to delivery, at the time of delivery, at the time they 
were recorded and since they were recorded on Febru-
ary 26,1964. 
Utah decisions clearly demonstrate that the plain-
tiffs had knowledge of the reservation of mineral in-
terests in the warranty deeds (Ex. P-2 and 3) at the 
time the deeds were recorded and that said knowledge 
14 
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started the running of the three year statute of limit-
ations for actions based on fraud. In McKellar v. Mc-
Kellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 48 P.2d 867 (1969) plaintiffs 
initiated an action to cancel a warranty deed executed 
in 1947 and duly recorded on the grounds of mistake. 
Plaintiffs filed their action in 1968. The trial court 
entered summary judgment upon defendant's motion 
and this court affirmed the summary judgment. One 
of this court's grounds for affirming the summary 
judgment was that the plaintiffs had constructive notice 
of the deed by operation of § 57-1-6 Utah Code An-
notated 1953 and § 57-3-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 
which provides: 
* 'Every conveyance . . . shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder of record, im-
part notice to all persons of the contents thereof; 
In McKellar v. McKellar, supra, the court cited 
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932). 
In that case plaintiff sought an action to set aside con-
veyances as defrauding creditors. This court reversed 
the trial court and held that the action was barred 
under the three year statute of limitations for the rea-
son that discovery of the conveyances was made, or 
the situation was such as to furnish full opportunity 
for the discovery of fraud, if any existed, more than 
three years before the action was filed. In reaching that 
conclusion, this court construed the three year statute 
of limitation and the recording statute. This court said : 
"Under the statute from the time of filing the 
conveyance with the recorder it shall impart no-
15 
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tice to all persons of the contents thereof. From 
the time of recording these conveyances all per-
sons, including plaintiffs, notice was imparted to 
them that the conveyances contained the state-
ments above quoted. That the plaintiffs and all 
other persons had notice that such conveyances 
had been made and recorded seems to go without 
saying, for surely, if one is charged with notice of 
the contents, he must be charged with notice of 
the existence of the document itself. . . . 
In this case the contents of the conveyances were 
of record and imparted notice of the contents 
and what the consideration was as shown thereby 
and all persons might be expected to inquire 
forthwith of what the 'other valuable considera-
tions' consisted, if the truthfulness was doubted 
and failing to do so would cause the statute to 
run from the time when a reasonably prudent 
person would have acted and thereby discovered 
falsity if it existed. 
# # # # 
. . . Unless the notice referred to in Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917, § 4900, means what it says then one is 
left to trace out from the uncertainties of human 
activities, memories, and conflicting interests 
what the facts were. Evidently the statute was 
intended to constitute notice of the contents of 
the recorded document, without reference to 
place of residence or otherwise. 
Under Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6468, the pro-
vision is clear that the limitation does not begin 
to run until the facts constituting the fraud are 
discovered. There is therefore a great deal said 
in the cases about what amounts to discovery. 
# # # # 
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The language of the Utah statute, Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917, § 6468, subd. 4 upon the provision re-
ferring to 'discovery/ contains the following lan-
guage: 'The cause of action in such case not to be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by 
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake.' 
The evidence discloses: The deeds were made 
and recorded in December, 1920. The deeds con-
tained, among other things, the statement 'for 
one dollar and other good and valuable consider-
ations.' At least one of the deeds contained an 
agreement to asume and pay two mortgages 
against the property conveyed in the sum of 
$1,000 each. There was a change of possession 
within about six months after the conveyances. 
The property was mortgaged by the grantees. 
All of this information could have been obtained 
readily upon inquiry. No inquiry of any nature 
seems to have been made. . . . 
We are of the opinion that the action is barred 
under the statute of limitations for the reason 
that discovery was made, or the situation was 
such as to furnish full opportunity for the dis-
covery of fraud, if any existed, more than three 
years before the bringing of the action. . . . " 
All of the authorities, even those cited by plaintiffs, 
compel the conclusion that the circumstances in the 
case at bar were such that the plaintiffs knew or should 
have known of the reservation of mineral interests in 
the deeds (Ex. P-2 and3) at the time the deeds were 
recorded. Furthermore, if they did not know it then 
they undoubtedly knew it when they had all of the sub-
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sequent title work done in connection with the real 
property described in those deeds, including the actual 
conveyance of part of the property to Mr. Warren in 
1967, five years before they filed their complaint. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to bring themselves under deci-
sions which cover persons vested with title in land for 
a considerable period of time is not relevant to the case 
at bar. The decisions cited by plaintiff support de-
fendants' position in connection with the knowledge of 
fraud required to start the statute of limitations run-
ning on February 26, 1964. Up until that time the 
plaintiffs in the case at bar were not vested with title. 
Prior to February 26, 1964, the plaintiffs in the case 
at bar were only purchasers of land under an executory 
contract to convey when the conditions of the contract 
were performed. In other words, even under plaintiffs' 
authorities the statute of limitations for fraud com-
menced to run under the circumstances of the case at 
bar when the deeds in issue were recorded on February 
26,1964. 
P O I N T I I I 
A N O T H E R C O N T E N T I O N T H A T S U P P O R T S 
T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E T R I A L COURT 
I S T H A T T H E P R I O R A G R E E M E N T S O F 
T H E P A R T I E S M E R G E D I N T H E W A R -
R A N T Y D E E D S W I T H T H E R E S E R V A -
T I O N S O F M I N E R A L I N T E R E S T S E V E N 
T H O U G H T H E D E E D S CONTAIN PROVI-
SIONS W H I C H A R E A L L E G E D L Y INCON-
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S I S T E N T W I T H T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F T H E 
P R I O R A G R E E M E N T S . T H E D E E D S SUP-
E R S E D E T H E A G R E E M E N T S . 
The warranty deeds which were delivered to the 
defendants superseded all prior contracts of sale even 
though said contracts may have been inconsistent with 
the deeds. All of the prior contracts are deemed to 
have been merged in the deeds under the circumstances 
of this case. In this case there were prior written agree-
ments concerning the sale of the real property under 
which the purchasers made payment in full according 
to the oral agreement of the amount of the unpaid 
balance and the seller delivered the deeds to the pur-
chasers who remained in possession under those deeds 
for approximately nine years before complaining about 
the reservations of mineral interests in the deeds. Dur-
ing that period the plaintiffs caused the deeds to have 
been recorded, mortgaged the property as owners, pur-
chased title insurance, farmed the property, paid taxes, 
probably inspected the deeds during all the times they 
were available to them after recording and did all other 
acts of dominion over the real property as though they 
were the owners under the deeds reserving the mineral 
interests in the defendants. Clearly, the plaintiffs ac-
cepted delivery of the deeds which caused all prior nego-
tiations and agreements to merge into them and super-
sede them. The application of the doctrine of merger 
is further warranted and compelled by estoppel and 
latches. Plaintiffs are estopped or prohibited from 
claiming fraud or mistake because of latches. See 
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Herminghausen v. Pierce (Okla.) 104 P.2d 252 
(1940); Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 42, 
172 Pac. 689 (1918); Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 
Utah 141, 158 Pac. 684 (1916); Savings § Trust Co. 
v. Stout, 36 Utah 206, 102 Pac. 865 (1909); Percifield 
v. Rosa (Colo.) 220 P.2d 546 (1950); Schillinger v. 
Huber (Mont.) 320 P.2d 346 (1958); Eisenberg v. 
Goldstein (111.) 195 N.E.2d 184 (1964); and Powell 
v.Esary (Wash.) 224 P.2d 323 (1950). 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R 
L. Ridd Larson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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